Society Does Not Really Need Government
From Saint-Simon, Henri. Deuxième extrait de mon ouvrage sur l'organisation sociale, L'Organisatuer. As reproduced in Henri Saint-Simon: selected writings on science, industry, and social organization, trans. Keith Taylor, ed. Keith Taylor (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1975), 207-210.
Henri Saint-Simon (1760-1825) was an aristocratic Frenchman deeply troubled by the misery of his poorer countrymen and the apparent inability of the government to create a better society. In the work excerpted below, Saint-Simon argues that governments generally exist only for their own power and gain. Saint-Simon proposes an ideal society that would recognize the cherished ideal of equality and that would dispense with humankind's ostensible need for government.
 
Hitherto rulers have regarded nations as patrimonies. The essential aim of all their political arrangements has been to exploit or expand these domains. Even those arrangements which have benefited the governed were really conceived by the rulers only as means of rendering their property either more productive or more secure. The resulting advantages have been regarded even by the people as favours, not as duties binding on the rulers.

Undoubtedly, this situation has undergone successive modifications, but only modifications; that is, the progress of enlightenment has always reduced governmental action more and more, but it has not yet changed its nature. Today this action is exercised less freely and in a smaller sphere, but it retains the same character. The old principle that kings are, by divine right, the born owners of their peoples is still accepted, at least in theory, as the fundamental principle. This is proved by the fact that every attempt to refute it is treated by the law as a crime against the state.

Nevertheless, on the other hand, a new general principle has been put forward by the governed. It has been recognized that the rulers are only the administrators of society, that they must direct it in conformity with the interests and will of the ruled, and that, in short, the happiness of nations is the sole and exclusive purpose of social organization. This principle has been adopted by the rulers, or at least it has already been accepted by them together with the old principle; that is, the rulers have recognized that they should administrate in this sense, although they still regard themselves as born administrators. One may consider the new principle to be established, since it is the constitutional function of one of the three parliamentary powers (the House of Commons) to defend it and turn it to account.

The establishment of this principle is undoubtedly a thoroughly capital step towards the organization of a new political system; but nevertheless this principle cannot, in its present state, have any really important consequence. One cannot hide the fact that hitherto it has been only a modifying principle, not a guiding principle. This is because it is much too vague actually to become the basis and point of departure of a new social order. It will not definitely assume this character until it is stated precisely, or rather completed. This is what we shall now endeavor to develop and prove.

In the present situation it is acknowledged that the permanent and sole duty of governments is to work for the happiness of society. But how is society's happiness to be achieved? This is a subject on which public opinion has not yet pronounced at all, on which, perhaps, there is not even one definite and generally accepted idea. And what has been the result? The general direction of society is inevitably left entirely to the arbitrary decision of the rulers. . . .

Without entering into more detailed considerations, every person who thinks about it for a moment will be convinced that as long as society merely orders its rulers in a vague fashion to make it happy, without having decided how [or in what direction] . . . [its direction and] rule will inevitably be arbitrary. . . .

In the new political order, the sole and permanent object of social organization should be to apply as well as possible the knowledge acquired in the sciences, fine arts, and arts and crafts to the satisfaction of men's needs; to disseminate that knowledge, improve it and increase it as much as possible; in short, to combine [it all] in as useful a way as possible. . . .

Hitherto men have, so to speak, exercised on nature only purely individual and isolated efforts. Furthermore, their forces have always in large measure destroyed each other, since the human race has hitherto been divided into two unequal parts, and the smaller has constantly employed all its power, and often even some of the power of the larger part, in order to dominate the latter, while the larger part has used up a great deal of its power in order to withstand domination. Nevertheless, it is certain that in spite of this enormous loss of power, the human race has, in the most civilized countries, achieved a quite remarkable degree of comfort and prosperity. From this one may judge the level it would reach if almost no power were lost, if men, instead of commanding one another, organized themselves to exercise their combined effort on nature, and if nations adopted the same system! . . .

In a society organized for the positive aim of working for its prosperity through the sciences, fine arts, and arts and crafts, the most important political act, the act which involves determining the direction in which society is to advance, no longer belongs to men invested [only] with social functions; it is exercised by the social body itself, in such a way that society, taken collectively, can really exercise [a] sovereignty . . . which then consists not in an arbitrary opinion established in law . . . but in a principle derived from the very nature of things, whose justice men have only to recognize and whose necessity they have only to proclaim. . . . The act of governing, in the sense of commanding, plays no or almost no part. All the questions which have to be debated in such a political system . . . are eminently positive and answerable; [the correct] decisions can only be the result of scientific demonstrations, absolutely independent of all human will, which may be discussed by those educated enough to understand them. . . . And just as every question of social interest will then inevitably be decided as well as it can be with acquired knowledge, so will all social functions be entrusted to the men most capable of performing them in conformity with the association's general aim. Thus . . . the three principal disadvantages of the present political system--arbitrariness, incapacity, and intrigue--will be seen to disappear at once.

. . . The functions which are peculiarly concerned with maintenance of social order will be classed . . . only according to their natural rank, as subordinate police functions.

. . . This part of social action is the only one in the new system requiring a certain degree of command in relations between men, since all the rest . . . involve the action of principles. It follows that the action of governing . . . will then be limited as much as possible. In this order men will consequently enjoy the highest degree of liberty compatible with the state of society. It must also be noted that this function of maintaining order can then easily become, almost entirely, a task shared by all citizens, whether it be to contain trouble-makers or to settle disputes. . . .